Scientific inquiry is shaped by evolving understandings of data, evidence, and the laws that appear to govern the natural world. Whether through the rise of big data, new empirical methods, or debates about the nature of scientific explanation, contemporary philosophy of science continues to refine how we interpret what science tells us about reality. These developments raise important questions not only for scientists and philosophers but also for theologians and scholars of religion who seek to engage constructively with scientific knowledge.
This conference explores how concepts such as evidence, natural laws, causation, and explanation function within scientific practice, and how these concepts intersect with religious and theological perspectives. As scientific disciplines generate increasingly complex forms of data and expand into new domains—from climate modelling to neuroscience and artificial intelligence—long‑standing questions about meaning, agency, and truth gain fresh urgency.
Bringing together philosophers of science, theologians, historians, and scientists, this conference will examine how religious thought can respond to, challenge, or be enriched by contemporary accounts of scientific reasoning. We will consider how different traditions interpret evidence, whether religious and scientific explanations can coexist or complement one another, and how metaphysical commitments shape our understanding of natural laws.
Through interdisciplinary dialogue, we aim to explore how scientific and religious communities might engage more fruitfully—offering deeper insight not only into the workings of the natural world but also into the broader human search for understanding.
Approximate running times GMT (tbc):
19th November: 12noon - 5pm (conference)
20th November: 9am - 2pm
The conference will feature two keynote lectures from Dr Mike Brownnutt of the Faraday Institute for Science and Religion, Cambridge (UK).
Thursday 19th: “The surprising things that models don’t tell us.”
Friday 20th: “How much should we (dis)believe our models?”
“If my pet were an elephant, it would have four legs. My pet does have four legs. Therefore… there is surprisingly little you can tell me about my pet, except how many legs it has.” To infer that my pet is an elephant because it had four legs is commit the fallacy of affirming the consequent. This logic has been known since at least Aristotle and is uncontroversial.
On the one hand, scientists know this, and recognise it easily in simple cases involving elephants and legs. On the other hand, scientists desperately want to affirm the consequent. “If the universe followed the laws of quantum mechanics, then my experiment would give result X. My experiment does give result X. Therefore… there is surprisingly little you can tell me about the universe, except that my experiment gave result X.” Our intuition says that we should be able to say more. We spend so much time and money doing science; surely, we must be able to say more. But what?
In these two keynote talks, I will first consider the nature of models, what they allow us to say about the universe, and why we use them. I will then consider some of the wide-ranging and counter-intuitive implications that this simple logical conundrum has for discussions of naturalism, divine action, free will, and the philosophy of mind.
Submissions are now closed. Successful speakers will be notified by 19th October.